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Abstract
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equi-
libria in games with a massive number of players.
So far, the only known game instances in which
the problem is solved in polynomial time are some
particular congestion games. However, a complete
characterization of hard and easy instances is still
lacking. In this paper, we extend the state of the
art along two main directions. First, we focus on
games where players’ actions are made of multiple
resources, and we prove that the problem is NP-
hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP, even
in the basic case in which players are symmetric,
their actions are made of only two resources, and
the cost functions are monotonic. Second, we focus
on games with singleton actions where the players
are partitioned into classes, depending on which ac-
tions they have available. In this case, we provide a
dynamic programming algorithm that finds an equi-
librium in polynomial time, when the number of
classes is fixed and the leader plays pure strategies.
Moreover, we prove that, if we allow for leader’s
mixed strategies, then the problem becomes NP-
hard even with only four classes and monotonic
costs. Finally, for both settings, we provide mixed-
integer linear programming formulations, and we
experimentally evaluate their scalability on both
random game instances and worst-case instances
based on our hardness reductions.
1 Introduction
In the last years, Stackelberg games and their correspond-
ing Stackelberg equilibria (SEs) received a lot of attention
in the artificial intelligence literature, thanks to their success-
ful applications in real-world settings, e.g., in security do-
mains [Tambe, 2011]. In a Stackelberg game, there is a spe-
cial player, called leader, who has the ability to commit to a
(potentially mixed) strategy beforehand, while the other play-
ers, who act as followers, decide how to play after observing
the commitment [Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010]. As most
∗Equal Contribution
of the works in the literature, see, e.g., [Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2006; Paruchuri et al., 2008; Conitzer and Korzhyk,
2011], we focus on optimistic SEs (OSEs), which assume that
the followers break ties in favor of the leader, maximizing
her utility. Few works also analyze pessimistic SEs, where
the followers break ties so as to minimize the leader’s util-
ity. However, the pessimistic assumption usually results in
computational problems that are much harder than their opti-
mistic counterparts, as showed, e.g., by Basilico et al. [2017]
and Coniglio et al. [2017; 2018].
It is well-known that, while finding an OSE in two-player
normal-form games is easy [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006],
the problem becomes much harder in games with multiple
followers playing a Nash equilibrium (NE). For instance,
Basilico et al. [2016; 2019] show that computing an OSE is
NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP in normal-form
games with only two followers, and De Nittis et al. [2018]
show the same result for polymatrix games with an arbitrary
number of followers. Moreover, finding an OSE is NP-hard
also in normal-form games with multiple followers playing
sequentially [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006], while the prob-
lem becomes easy if they play simultaneously in a correlated
manner [Conitzer and Korzhyk, 2011].
Recently, Marchesi et al. [2018] and Castiglioni et
al. [2018] studied the problem of computing OSEs in con-
gestion games (CGs). In a CG, the players’ actions are sub-
sets of a given set of shared resources, and each resource
has a cost that depends on the number of players using it
(a.k.a. congestion). Most of the computational studies on
CGs, see, e.g., [Fabrikant et al., 2004; Ieong et al., 2005;
Ackermann et al., 2008], focus on finding pure-strategy NEs.
Instead, Marchesi et al. [2018] and Castiglioni et al. [2018]
apply the Stackelberg paradigm to CGs, assuming that the
followers play a pure-strategy NE after observing the leader’s
mixed-strategy commitment. These works focus on singleton
CGs, where actions are made of only one resource. Specifi-
cally, Marchesi et al. [2018] show that an OSE can be found
in polynomial time when costs are monotonic in the conges-
tion and players are symmetric (i.e., they share the same set
of actions), even when the number of followers is non-fixed.
Castiglioni et al. [2018] show that the same holds even with
non-monotonic costs if we restrict the leader to pure strate-
gies. These results provide some examples of multi-follower
Stackelberg games where finding an equilibrium is computa-
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tionally tractable. On the other hand, Castiglioni et al. [2018]
also show that, if either the costs are non-monotonic or play-
ers are not symmetric, then the problem becomes NP-hard
and not in Poly-APX, unless P = NP.
Identifying new classes of multi-follower Stackelberg
games where SEs can be computed in time polynomial in
the number of players is crucial for real-world problems,
enabling the adoption of SEs in massive applications, such
as, e.g., resource-sharing systems with premium (prioritized)
users, cybersecuirty with multiple treats, and influence maxi-
mization in social networks. Despite this, a complete charac-
terization of hard and easy game instances is still lacking.
Original Contributions
In this paper, we extend the state of the art on the computa-
tional problem of finding OSEs in CGs, identifying new cases
in which it is solvable in polynomial time and others where it
is not. First, we show that having actions made of only one
resource is necessary to have efficient (polynomial-time) al-
gorithms. Indeed, we prove that finding an OSE is NP-hard
and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP, even if players’ actions
contain only two resources, costs are monotonic, and players
are symmetric. Then, we introduce and study singleton CGs
in which the players are partitioned into classes, with follow-
ers of the same class sharing the same set of actions. These
are a generalization of singleton CGs with symmetric play-
ers, capturing the common case in which users can be split
into (usually few) different classes, such as, e.g., users with
different priorities. For these games, we provide a dynamic
programming algorithm that computes an OSE in polynomial
time, when the number of classes is fixed and the leader is re-
stricted to play pure strategies. On the other hand, we prove
that, if the leader is allowed to play mixed strategies, then
the problem becomes NP-hard even with only four classes
and monotonic costs. Finally, for both settings, we design
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulations for
computing OSEs, and we experimentally evaluate them on a
testbed containing both randomly generated game instances
and worst-case instances based on our hardness reductions. 1
2 Related works
In this work, we apply the Stackelberg paradigm to CGs fol-
lowing the approach of Von Stengel and Zamir [2010] and
Conitzer and Sandholm [2006], i.e., we treat the leader as a
special player who seeks for an optimal (in terms of her util-
ity) strategy to commit to. In the literature, there are a number
of works that apply the Stackelberg paradigm to CGs follow-
ing different approaches. Even if these works address settings
that are are substantially different from ours, it is worth dis-
cussing how their results relate to our work.
There are some works, such as, e.g., [Roughgarden, 2004;
Swamy, 2007; Sharma and Williamson, 2009; Fotakis, 2010],
which study CGs where the leader is an authority whose
objective is to minimize the inefficacy (in terms of follow-
ers’ social welfare) of the NE reached by the followers (i.e.,
minimize the price of anarchy). This setting is fundamen-
tally different form ours, as we assume that the leader looks
1All the proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in Appendix A.
for a strategy to commit to that minimizes her own cost,
while she is not concerned with the maximization of fol-
lowers’ social welfare. Let us remark that our approach
leads to what is usually called OSE, while the Stackelberg
strategies analyzed in these works are not OSEs according
to the classical definitions [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006;
Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010].
Moreover, there are other works, such as, e.g., [Leme et
al., 2012; De Jong and Uetz, 2014; Correa et al., 2015],
which apply the Stackelberg paradigm to CGs following yet
another approach. They assume that the players play sequen-
tially in a predefined order, reaching a subgame perfect equi-
librium (SPE) in the extensive-form extension of the origi-
nal CG where each player plays after observing the actions
performed by the preceding players. This is different from
our setting in two fundamental ways: (i) we assume that the
followers play simultaneously, rather than sequentially; and
(ii) these works study the inefficiency (in terms of follow-
ers’ social welfare) of SPEs, rather than the computational
problem of finding an optimal leader’s strategy. Furthermore,
we remark that an OSE is an SPE of a particular extensive-
form extension of the original CG, known as mixed exten-
sion [Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010]. In this extended game,
the leader first commits to a mixed strategy (having a con-
tinuum of actions), and, then, the followers observe it and
play simultaneously, reaching an NE. This is different from
the extensive-form extension studied in the work by Leme et
al. [2012] and its follow-ups, where only pure-strategy com-
mitments are possible and the followers play sequentially.
3 Preliminaries
We study Stackelberg congestion games (SCGs) with one
leader and multiple followers playing an NE in the CG re-
sulting from the leader’s commitment. An SCG is a tuple
(N,R,A, c`, cf ), defined as follows. N = F ∪ {`} is a finite
set of players, the leader ` and the followers p ∈ F . R is a
finite set of resources. A = {Ap}p∈N , where Ap ⊆ 2R is
the set of player p’s actions, with each action ap ∈ Ap be-
ing a non-empty subset of resources, i.e, ap ⊆ R. Finally,
c` = {ci,`}i∈R and cf = {ci,f}i∈R are, respectively, the
leader’s and followers’ cost functions, with ci,`, ci,f : N→ Q
being the costs of resource i as a function of its congestion.
As usual, we assume ci,`(0) = ci,f (0) = 0 for every i ∈ R.
Moreover, we let n := |N | and r := |R| be the number of
players and resources, respectively.
Let σp ∈ ∆p be a player p’s strategy, which is a probability
distribution over actions Ap, with σp(ap) denoting the proba-
bility of playing action ap ∈ Ap. A strategy σp ∈ ∆p is pure
when it prescribes to play a single action ap ∈ Ap with prob-
ability σp(ap) = 1; otherwise, σp is mixed. With an abuse of
notation, given σp ∈ ∆p, let σp(i) :=
∑
ap3i σp(ap) be the
probability of selecting resource i ∈ R when σp is played.
We denote with σ = (σ`, a) a strategy profile, i.e., a tuple of
players’ strategies, in which the leader plays a (potentially)
mixed strategy σ` ∈ ∆` and the followers play pure strate-
gies that determine a followers’ action profile a = (ap)p∈F ,
which belongs to the set AF =×p∈F Ap.
Given a followers’ action profile a ∈ AF , we let νai :=
|{p ∈ F | i ∈ ap}| be the number of followers selecting re-
source i ∈ R in a. For ease of presentation, we define the
followers’ configuration induced by a as the vector νa ∈ Nr
whose i-th component is νai . Furthermore, for σ` ∈ ∆`, cσ`i,f :
N → Q encodes the followers’ expected cost of resource
i ∈ R given σ`, as a function of the number x of followers se-
lecting i, i.e., cσ`i,f (x) = σ`(i)ci,f (x+1)+(1−σ`(i))ci,f (x).
Intuitively, the followers who select resource i experience a
congestion incremented by one whenever the leader chooses
i, which happens with probability σ`(i). When player p ∈ N
plays an action ap ∈ Ap, she pays the sum of the costs of
resources i ∈ ap. Thus, given a strategy profile σ = (σ`, a),
cσp :=
∑
i∈ap c
σ`
i,f (ν
a
i ) is the cost of follower p ∈ F in σ, and
cσ` :=
∑
a`∈A` σ`(a`)
∑
i∈a` ci,`(ν
a
i + 1) is the leader’s one.
In an SCG, after observing a leader’s strategy σ` ∈ ∆`, the
followers play a new CG with resource costs cσ`i,f , for i ∈ R.
Specifically, we assume that the followers play an NE in pure
strategies [Nash, 1951]. Formally, given σ = (σ`, a), a is a
(pure-strategy) NE for σ` if, for every p ∈ F and a′p ∈ Ap,
cσp ≤ cσ
′
p , where σ
′ = (σ`, a′) and a′ ∈ AF is obtained from
a by replacing ap with a′p. In words, in an NE, there is no
follower who has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from ap
by playing another action a′p. Given σ` ∈ ∆`, we let Eσ` be
the set of NEs in the followers’ game for σ`. 2
Different subclasses of SCGs can be defined by making ad-
ditional assumptions on their elements. For instance, one pos-
sibility is to require that players’ cost functions be (weakly)
monotonic in the resource congestion, i.e., for every resource
i ∈ R, it must be the case that ci,`(x) ≤ ci,`(x + 1) and
ci,f (x) ≤ ci,f (x+ 1) for all x ∈ N.
Another possibility is to restrict the structure of the players’
action sets Ap. Along this direction, we address Stackelberg
singleton congestion games (SSCGs), which are SCGs with
players’ actions required to be singletons, i.e., |ap| = 1 for
every p ∈ N and ap ∈ Ap. Thus, when studying such games,
we identify actions with resources, assuming Ap ⊆ R for all
p ∈ N . We also use σ` ∈ ∆` as if it were directly defined
over resources inA`, with σ`(i) being the probability of play-
ing resource i ∈ A`. Moreover, given σ = (σ`, a), we have
cσp = c
σ`
ap,f
(νaap) and c
σ
` =
∑
i∈A` σ`(i)ci,`(ν
a
i + 1).
Finally, we can consider different kinds of players’ struc-
tures. Here, we focus on two notable cases. In the first one,
all players share the same set of actions, i.e., Ap = A ⊆ 2R
for all p ∈ N . We refer to these games as symmetric. Instead,
in the second case, there exists a finite set T = {1, . . . , T} of
followers’ classes, with followers of the same class sharing
the same set of actions. We say that these games are T -class.
Specifically, in a T -class SCG, we can partition the follow-
ers into T disjoint sets, i.e., F =
⋃
t∈T Ft, so that, for each
t ∈ T , Ap = At ⊆ 2R for all p ∈ Ft. We also let |Ft| = nt
2Let us remark that we can safely restrict the attention to pure-
strategy NEs, as one is guaranteed to exist in every CG [Rosen-
thal, 1973]. Moreover, it is natural to assume that the followers
will end up playing pure-strategy NEs, since they are reachable by
best-response dynamics [Monderer and Shapley, 1996], where play-
ers continuously change their actions, one at a time, playing a best
response to the current players’ configuration.
be the number of followers of class t ∈ T . When studying
these games, given a followers’ action profile a ∈ AF , we
let νat,i := |{p ∈ Ft | i ∈ ap}| be the number of followers
of class t ∈ T selecting resource i ∈ R in a. Moreover, we
define the followers’ configuration of class t induced by a as
the vector νat ∈ Nr whose i-th component is νat,i. 3
Observe that T -class SSCGs can be fully analyzed using
followers’ configurations, rather than action profiles. This is
because only the number of followers of each class select-
ing each resource is significant, and, thus, a followers’ action
profile a ∈ AF can be equivalently represented with the fol-
lowers’ configurations {νat }t∈T . Thus, we can directly use
the vector νt ∈ Nr with
∑
i∈R νt,i = nt to denote a follow-
ers’ configuration of class t ∈ T . Moreover, given {νt}t∈T ,
we let ν ∈ Nr be such that νi :=
∑
t∈T νt,i for i ∈ R. No-
tice that, given a strategy profile σ = (σ`, {νt}t∈T ), {νt}t∈T
is an NE for σ` if, for every class t ∈ T , and resources
i ∈ At : νt,i > 0 and j ∈ At, it holds cσ`i,f (νi) ≤ cσ`j,f (νj +1).
In conclusion, in an SCG, an OSE prescribes the leader
an optimal strategy to commit to, assuming that the followers
play a pure-strategy NE minimizing her cost in the CG result-
ing from the commitment. Formally, σ = (σ`, a) is an OSE
if it solves the problem: minσ′`∈∆` mina′∈Eσ′` c
σ′=(σ′`,a
′)
` .
4 Complexity Results on SCG
First, we study the problem of computing an OSE in SCGs,
and we prove it is intractable even when the game is sym-
metric, cost functions are monotonic, and players’ actions
are made of only two resources. Thus, non-singleton actions
make the problem considerably harder than in the singleton
case, which admits a polynomial-time algorithm in symmet-
ric games with monotonic costs [Marchesi et al., 2018].
In particular, we show that the problem is NP-hard and not
in Poly-APX unless P = NP, i.e., the leader’s cost in an OSE
cannot be efficiently approximated up to any polynomial fac-
tor in the size of the input. Our results are based on a reduc-
tion from 3SAT, a well-know NP-complete problem [Garey
and Johnson, 1979]. Intuitively, given  > 0, we map any
3SAT instance to an SCG that admits an OSE σ with cσ` = 
if and only if 3SAT is satisfiable, otherwise cσ` = 1.
Theorem 1. Computing an OSE in symmetric SCGs is NP-
hard, even when cost functions are monotonic and players’
actions have cardinality at most two.
By letting  = 1
2I
, where I is the game size, the reduction
used for Theorem 1 also shows the following:
Theorem 2. The problem of computing an OSE in symmetric
SCGs is not in Poly-APX unless P =NP, even when costs are
monotonic and players’ actions have cardinality two.
In conclusion, we provide some side results that deepen
our analysis on how non-singleton actions impact on the com-
plexity of finding an OSE in SCGs. The following theorem
shows that our intractability results hold even in SCGs where
only the followers have non-singleton actions.
3Let us remark that symmetric SCGs are a special case of T -
class SCGs with only one class, i.e., T = {1}, and leader’s action
set equal to the followers’, i.e., A` = A1.
Theorem 3. The problem of computing an OSE in SCGs is
NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP, even when
leader’s actions are singletons, costs are monotonic, and fol-
lowers are symmetric with actions of cardinality at most two.
Since the OSEs of the games used in our reduction pre-
scribe the leader to play a pure strategy, we have that:
Observation 1. The results in Theorems 1, 2, and 3 hold even
if we restrict the leader to play pure strategies.
Finally, let us consider the case in which only the leader has
non-singleton actions. We have the following observation.
Observation 2. In SCGs with symmetric followers having
singleton actions, an OSE can be found in polynomial time
if we restrict the leader to play pure strategies. 4
A polynomial-time algorithm enumerates the leader’s pure
strategies, and, for each of them, it computes an NE mini-
mizing the leader’s cost in the resulting followers’ symmetric
singleton CG, which can be done in polynomial time using
dynamic programming, as shown by Ieong et al. [2005].
5 Complexity Results on T -class SSCG
We switch the attention to SSCGs, i.e., games where play-
ers’ actions are singletons. In particular, we focus on T -class
SSCGs, a generalization of symmetric SSCGs. As shown
by Castiglioni et al. [2018], finding an OSE in symmetric SS-
CGs with non-monotonic costs is NP-hard, while the prob-
lem becomes easy if: (a) we assume that the leader can only
play pure strategies [Castiglioni et al., 2018], or (b) we force
players’ costs be monotonic [Marchesi et al., 2018].
Here, first we show that, under condition (a), computing an
OSE is easy also in T -class SSCGs with a fixed number of
classes. Next, we prove that, if condition (a) does not hold,
then the problem is NP-hard in T -class SSCGs even if we
enforce (b) and there are only four followers’ classes.
Let us start providing a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing OSEs in T -class SSCGs with a fixed number of
classes and the leader restricted to pure strategies. Our al-
gorithm iterates over leader’s pure strategies, i.e., resources
i ∈ A`, and, for each of them, it finds an NE minimizing the
leader’s cost in the followers’ game for σ` ∈ ∆` : σ`(i) = 1.
Such NE is computed with an extension of the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm proposed by Ieong et al. [2005] for find-
ing an optimal NE in symmetric singleton CGs without lead-
ership. We extend the algorithm to T -class singleton CGs
without leadership, which are defined as their Stackelberg
counterpart, except for the fact that there is no leader and all
players experience the same resource costs c = {ci}i∈R, with
ci : N→ Q defined as usual.
We define O(h,B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) as
the cost of an optimal (according to some optimality crite-
rion) NE for a T -class singleton CG restricted to i resources
{1, 2, . . . , i} ⊆ R and Bt players for each class t ∈ T , where
Mt is the largest cost experienced by a player of class t and
Vt is the smallest cost a player of class t would get by switch-
ing to another resource. When the optimality criterion is the
minimization of the sum of players’ costs, we have:
4 We leave as an open problem the study of the computational
complexity when the leader is allowed to play mixed strategies.
Lemma 4. O(i, B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) sat-
isfies the following recursive equation:
O(i, B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) =
min
pt∈{0,...,Bt} ∀t∈T
mt∈{0,...,Mt} ∀t∈T
vt∈{1,...,Vt} ∀t∈T
O(i− 1, p1, . . . , pT ,m1, . . . ,mT , v1, . . . , vT ) + bci(b)
s.t. b =
∑
t∈T
(Bt − pt) (1a)
Bt = pt ∀t ∈ T : i /∈ At (1b)
mt ≤Mt ∀t ∈ T (1c)
vt ≥ Vt ∀t ∈ T (1d)
ci(b) ≤Mt ∀t ∈ T : Bt − pt > 0 (1e)
ci(b+ 1) ≥ Vt ∀t ∈ T : i ∈ At (1f)
ci(b) ≤ vt ∀t ∈ T : Bt − pt > 0 (1g)
ci(b+ 1) ≥ mt ∀t ∈ T : i ∈ At. (1h)
Remark 1. Lemma 4 holds also for other optimality criteria,
e.g., the minimization of the cost of a given resource.
Thus, we can conclude the following:
Theorem 5. In T -class singleton CGs without leadership,
an optimal (given an optimality criterion) NE can be found in
O(n6T r4T+1). In T -class SSCGs, an OSE can be found in
O(n6T r4T+2) if we restrict the leader to play pure strategies.
Corollary 5.1. In T -class SSCGs with a fixed number of
classes, an OSE can be found in polynomial time if we re-
strict the leader to play pure strategies.
Now, we prove the hardness result, using a reduction from
K-PARTITION, an NP-compete variant of PARTITION
with an additional size constraint [Castiglioni et al., 2018].
Theorem 6. Computing an OSE in T -class SSCGs is NP-
hard, even when cost functions are monotonic and |T | = 4.
6 Mathematical Programming Formulations
In this section, we provide two MILP formulations for finding
OSEs in SCGs. The first one is specifically tailored to T -class
SSCGs, while the second one works for general SCGs.
Let us start with T -class SSCGs. For ease of presenta-
tion, let V (i) := {1, . . . , vmaxi } be the set of possible conges-
tion levels induced by the followers on resource i ∈ R, with
vmaxi :=
∑
t∈T :i∈At nt. Moreover, let V (t) := {1, . . . , nt}
for t ∈ T . For every class t ∈ T , resource i ∈ At, and value
v ∈ V (t), let us introduce the binary variable qtiv , which
is equal to 1 if and only if v followers of class t select re-
source i. Furthermore, for every i ∈ R and v ∈ V (i), let
the binary variable yiv be equal to 1 if and only if v followers
select resource i. These variables represent followers’ con-
figurations. Specifically, for t ∈ T , νt ∈ Nr is such that
νt,i =
∑
v∈V (t) v qtiv for all i ∈ R, while ν ∈ Nr is such
that νi =
∑
v∈V (i) v yiv for all i ∈ R. For every i ∈ R, let
αi ∈ [0, 1] be equal to σ`(i), and, for v ∈ V (i), let the auxil-
iary variable ziv be equal to the bilinear term yivαi. Finally,
let M > max{ci,f (v) | i ∈ R, v ∈ {1, . . . , vmaxi + 2}}.
The complete MILP formulation reads as follows:
min
∑
i∈R
∑
v∈V (i)
ci,`(v + 1) ziv (2a)
s.t.
∑
v∈V (t)
qtiv ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ At (2b)
∑
v∈V (i)
yiv ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R (2c)
∑
i∈At
∑
v∈V (t)
v qtiv = nt ∀t ∈ T (2d)
∑
t∈T :i∈At
∑
v∈V (t)
v qtiv =
∑
v∈V (i)
v yiv ∀i ∈ R (2e)
∑
v∈V (j)
(
yjvcj,f (v + 1) + zjv
(
cj,f (v + 2)− cj,f (v + 1)
))
≥
∑
v∈V (i)
(
yivci,f (v) + ziv
(
ci,f (v + 1)− ci,f (v)
))
+
−M
(
1−
∑
v∈V (t)
qtiv
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀i 6= j ∈ At (2f)
ziv ≤ αi ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (2g)
ziv ≤ yiv ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (2h)
ziv ≥ αi + yiv − 1 ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (2i)
ziv ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (2j)∑
i∈R
αi = 1 (2k)
αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ R (2l)
αi = 0 ∀i /∈ A` (2m)
qtiv ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ At, v ∈ V (t) (2n)
yiv ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i). (2o)
Function (2a) is the leader’s expected cost. Con-
straints (2b) ensure that at most one variable qtiv be equal
to 1 for each class t ∈ T and resource i ∈ At, and, thus, the
number of followers of class t on each resource is uniquely
determined (note that
∑
v∈V (t) qtiv = 0 if no follower of
class t selects resource i). Constraints (2c) ensure that at
most one variable yiv be equal to 1 for each resource i ∈ R,
which guarantees that the congestion level of each resource
is uniquely determined. Constraints (2d) guarantee that the
followers’ configuration be well-defined, i.e., for all t ∈ T ,
exactly nt followers of class t are present. Constrains (2e)
ensure that the congestion level on resource i ∈ R be equal
to the sum of the congestion levels induced by all classes.
Constraints (2f) force the followers’ configurations defined
by the qtiv variables be an NE for the leader’s strategy iden-
tified by the αi variables. This follows from the fact that,
being ziv = yivαi and zjv = yjvαj , the right-hand side is
the cost incurred by the followers of class t ∈ T selecting
resource i ∈ At, while the left-hand side is the cost they
would incur after deviating to j 6= i ∈ At. Note that, for
each t ∈ T , the constrains are active only if there is at least
one follower of class t selecting i. Finally, Constraints (2g)–
(2j) are McCormick envelope constraints [McCormick, 1976]
which guarantee ziv = yivαi when yiv ∈ {0, 1}.
Next, we extend Formulation (2) to deal with general
SCGs. Letting vmaxi := |{p ∈ F | ∃ap ∈ Ap : i ∈ ap}|
be the maximum number of followers who can select re-
source i ∈ R, we define V (i) := {1, . . . , vmaxi }. For ev-
ery follower p ∈ F and action ap ∈ Ap, we introduce
the binary variable xp ap , which is equal to 1 if and only p
plays ap. Moreover, for every a` ∈ A`, let αa` ∈ [0, 1] be
equal to σ`(a`). All the variables already defined in Formu-
lation (2) are used here with the same meaning. Finally, let
M >
∑
i∈R max{ci,f (v) | i ∈ R, v ∈ {1, . . . , vmaxi + 2}}.
The complete MILP formulation reads as follows:
min
∑
i∈R
∑
v∈V (i)
ci,`(v + 1) ziv (3a)
s.t.
∑
ap∈Ap
xp ap = 1 ∀p ∈ F (3b)
∑
v∈V (i)
yiv ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ R (3c)
∑
v∈V (i)
v yiv =
∑
p∈F
∑
ap∈Ap:i∈ap
xp ap ∀i ∈ R (3d)
∑
i∈a′p\ap
∑
v∈V (i)
(
yivci,f (v + 1) + ziv
(
ci,f (v + 2)− ci,f (v + 1)
))
≥
∑
i∈ap\a′p
∑
v∈V (i)
(
yivci,f (v) + ziv
(
ci,f (v + 1)− ci,f (v)
))
+
−M
(
1− xp ap
)
∀p ∈ F, ap 6= a′p ∈ Ap (3e)
ziv ≤
∑
a`∈A`:i∈a`
αa` ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (3f)
ziv ≤ yiv ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (3g)
ziv ≥
∑
a`∈A`:i∈a`
αa` + yiv − 1 ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (3h)
ziv ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i) (3i)∑
a`∈A`
αa` = 1 (3j)
αa` ≥ 0 ∀a` ∈ A` (3k)
xp ap ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ F, ∀ap ∈ Ap (3l)
yiv ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ R, ∀v ∈ V (i). (3m)
Function (3a), Constraints (3c), and Constraints (3e)–(3k)
have the same meaning as their counterparts in Formula-
tion (2). Note that, in this case, ziv = yiv
∑
a`∈A`:i∈a` αa` ,
where the summation represents the probability σ`(i) and σ`
is identified by the αa` variables. Constraints (3b) ensure
that each follower selects exactly one action. Constraints (3d)
guarantee that the followers’ configuration represented by the
variables yiv be well-defined. Note that, Constraints (3e) are
enforced for each follower p ∈ F here, and they are active
only for the action ap ∈ Ap that she plays. Constraints (3e)
do not account for the costs of resources i ∈ ap ∪ a′p, since
they do not change when deviating from ap to a′p.
7 Experimental Results
There is no standard testbed for our games and there is no
evidence that some structured games are more representative
than others. Thus, we test the MILP formulations proposed
in Section 6 on randomly generated games, which represent
instances of average-case complexity, and games based on
the reductions provided in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 6,
which, instead, represent worst-case complexity instances.
All the experiments are run on a UNIX machine with a total
of 32 cores working at 2.3 GHz, equipped with 128 GB of
RAM. Each instance is solved on a single core within a time
limit of 3600 seconds. We use GUROBI 7.0 (with Python
interface) as MILP solver.
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Figure 1: Computing times of Formulations (2) and (3) on randomly generated game instances and worst-case instances.
Random Game Instances
For T -class SSCGs, we generate random game instances
with r ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} resources
and T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} classes, with nt ∈ {0.2 r, 0.5 r, r} fol-
lowers per class t ∈ T and |At| = 0.5 r actions per class
t ∈ T . Cost functions are randomly generated by sampling
uniformly from {1, . . . , nrT}. For general SCGs, we gen-
erate instances with r ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25} resources and
n ∈ {r, 2 r, 3 r} followers, with |ap| ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} re-
sources per action ap ∈ Ap and |Ap| = 0.5 r actions per
player p ∈ N . Cost functions are randomly generated by
sampling uniformly from {1, . . . , nr}. We build a testbed
with 20 game instances per combination of the parameters.
Figure 1(a) displays the average computing times for For-
mulation (2) with 0.5 r followers per class. The formulation
scales quite well in practice. Symmetric games (T = 1) are
quickly solved up to r = 100. Moreover, we are able to solve
within the time limit games with up to four classes, 40 re-
sources, and 160 players (40 players per class). Let us notice
that the dynamic programming algorithm presented in Theo-
rem 5 can be employed in this setting to find an OSE, if we
restrict the leader to play pure strategies. However, prelimi-
nary experiments show that its scalability is extremely limited
with respect to that of our formulation, as it finds a solution
within the time limit only for games with less than 10 re-
sources, while our formulation scales on much bigger games
and it also works for mixed-strategy commitments.
Figure 1(c) shows the average computing times for Formu-
lation (3) with 2 r followers. We can conclude that, as ex-
pected, game instances with non-singleton actions are much
harder to solve than singleton games. Here, the largest game
instances we can solve within the time limit feature actions of
cardinality two, 15 resources, and 30 players. 5
Worst-Case Instances
We test Formulation (3) on instances built according to the re-
duction in Theorem 1. Specifically, we generate these games
from random 3SAT instances with |U | ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
variables and |C| = k|U | clauses, where k ≈ 4.26 is
the phase transition parameter determining generally hard-to-
solve 3SAT instances [Cheeseman et al., 1991]. We test 10
random instances for each number of variables. Furthermore,
we experiment Formulation (2) on instances based on the re-
5We report additional experimental results in Appendix B.
duction in Theorem 6. We generate these games from random
K-PARTITION instances with |S| ∈ {20, 40, . . . , 160} in-
tegers, si ∈ [2, 100] for all si ∈ S, and K = |S|2 . We test 10
random instances for each value of |S|.
Figures 1(b) and 1(d) show the computing times for T -
class SSCGs and SCGs, respectively. Surprisingly, the results
we obtain are comparable to those for random games, empiri-
cally showing that, for the games we study, random instances
are not easier to solve than structured ones, as instead it is the
case, e.g., in normal-form games [Sandholm et al., 2005].
8 Discussion and Future Works
This paper studies the problem of computing Stackelberg
equilibria in multi-follower Stackelberg games with a mas-
sive number of players, focusing on congestion games. Our
results shed light on the boundary between hard and easy
game instances, significantly advancing the state of the art.
Our analysis about games with non-singleton actions
shows that, in oder to compute an equilibrium in time poly-
nomial in the number of players, singleton actions are neces-
sary (Theorems 1 and 2). This answers a question left open
by Castiglioni et al. [2018]. Surprisingly, our negative result
holds even in games where each action is made of at most two
resources. Future works could address non-singleton games
with players’ actions enjoying specific structures, as it is the
case, e.g., in games played on graphs [Werneck et al., 2000].
Our findings about congestion games with multiple classes
of players substantially improve known results on symmet-
ric (i.e., single-class) games. Our dynamic programming al-
gorithm can compute optimal leader’s pure-strategy commit-
ments in time polynomial in the number of players, even
when costs are arbitrary functions and the players are split
into a (fixed) number of different classes (Theorem 5).
Future extensions of this work may investigate how adopt-
ing a different solution concept for the followers’ game, such
as, e.g., the correlated equilibrium [Aumann, 1974], affects
the computation of equilibria. This has been recently studied
for polynomial-type games [Castiglioni et al., 2019].
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A Omitted Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on reduction from 3SAT,
which reads as follows.
Definition 1 (3SAT). Given a finite set C of 3-literal clauses
defined over a finite set U of variables, is there a truth assign-
ment to the variables which satisfies all clauses? 6
Theorem 1. Computing an OSE in symmetric SCGs is NP-
hard, even when cost functions are monotonic and players’
actions have cardinality at most two.
Proof. We provide a reduction from 3SAT showing that
a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an OSE in SCGs
would allow us to solve any 3SAT instance in polynomial
time. Given a 3SAT instance (C,U) and a number 0 <
 < 1, we build an SCG Γ(C,U) admitting an OSE σ with
cσ` =  if and only if (C,U) is satisfiable.
Mapping. Γ(C,U) is defined as follows:
• N = F ∪ {`} with F = {pu | u ∈ U} ∪ {pφ | φ ∈ C};
• R = {rw} ∪ {ru, ru¯, ru,t | u ∈ U} ∪ {rφ | φ ∈ C};
• Ap = {au = {ru, ru,t}, au¯ = {ru¯, ru,t} | u ∈ U} ∪
{aw = {rw}} ∪ {aφ,l = {rφ, rl} | φ ∈ C, l ∈ φ} for all
p ∈ N .
Cost functions are specified in the following table, and, addi-
tionally, cru¯,f = cru,f and ci,` = ci,f for all i ∈ R.
x crφ,f cru,f cru,t,f crw,f
1 1 0 3 
[2, |C|+ |U |+ 1] 5 2 5 4
Clearly, given (C,U), Γ(C,U) can be constructed in poly-
nomial time, since n = |C| + |U | + 1, r = |C| + 3|U | + 1,
and |Ap| = 3|C| + 2|U | + 1 for all p ∈ N . Let us remark
that Γ(C,U) is symmetric, cost functions are monotonic,
and each action has cardinality at most two. Moreover, the
leader’s cost is  if and only if she is the only player who
plays the singleton action aw, otherwise her cost is at least 1,
since other actions contain two resources.
If. Suppose that (C,U) is satisfiable, and let τ : U →
{T,F} be a truth assignment satisfying all clauses in C. Let
σ` ∈ ∆` : σ`(aw) = 1. Using τ , we can build σ = (σ`, a),
with a ∈ Eσ` , such that cσ` = . Since  is the minimum
leader’s cost and the followers behave optimistically, σ is an
OSE. In particular, for every φ ∈ C, there must be a follower
p ∈ F such that ap = aφ,l, where l ∈ φ evaluates to true
under τ . Clearly, one such literal l ∈ φ always exists. When
there are many, take one minimizing νarl . Moreover, for every
u ∈ U , if τ(u) = T, respectively τ(u) = F, there must be
a follower p ∈ F such that ap = au¯, respectively ap = au.
Thus, νarφ = 1 for all φ ∈ C, and, similarly, νaru,t = 1 for all
u ∈ U . Additionally, νarw = 0 as there are |C|+|U | followers.
Next, we show that a ∈ Eσ` . First, followers p ∈ F with
ap = aφ,l experience a cost cσp = crφ,f (ν
a
rφ
) + crl,f (ν
a
rl
) ≤
3, since νarφ = 1. Thus, they do not have any incentive to
6 We refer to a 3SAT instance as (C,U). Moreover, l ∈ φ
denotes a literal (i.e., a variable or its negation) appearing in φ ∈ C,
while u(l) is the variable corresponding to that literal.
deviate. If they switch to aφ′,l′ (with φ′ 6= φ), then they
would pay at least 5 (as νarφ′ = 1). Furthermore, they do not
deviate to aφ,l′ (with l′ 6= l ∈ φ), as, if l′ is false, then they
would pay 3, while, when l′ is true, they would incur a cost
of crφ,f (ν
a
rφ
) + crl′ ,f (ν
a
rl′ ) ≥ cσp (as νarl′ ≥ νarl ). If, instead,
they deviate to au or au¯, then their cost would be at least 5
(as νaru,t = 1). Moreover, they do not switch to aw, since
they would pay 4. Followers p ∈ F with ap = au has cost
cσp = cru,f (ν
a
ru) + cru,t,f (ν
a
ru,t) = 3 since ν
a
ru = 1. Thus,
they do not deviate, as they would pay at least 4. Similarly,
followers p ∈ F with ap = au¯ do not deviate. As a result, a
is an NE and, since σ`(aw) = 1 and νarw = 0, it holds c
σ
` = .
Only if. Suppose there exists an OSE σ = (σ`, a) such that
cσ` = . Thus, σ`(aw) = 1 and ν
a
rw = 0. For u ∈ U , νaru,t ≤
1, otherwise, if νaru,t ≥ 2, some followers would have an
incentive to deviate to action aw, paying 4 < 5. Analogously,
for φ ∈ C, νarφ ≤ 1. Since there are |C| + |U | followers,
νaru,t = 1 for every u ∈ U , and νarφ = 1 for every φ ∈ C.
Thus, for every u ∈ U , there exists p ∈ F such that either
ap = au or ap = au¯, and no other follower selects actions
au and au¯. Define a truth assignment τ such that τ(u) = T
if there is p ∈ F with ap = au¯, while τ(u) = F if there is
p ∈ F with ap = au. Clearly, τ is well-defined. Moreover,
for every φ ∈ C, there exists a unique follower p ∈ F and a
literal l ∈ φ such that ap = aφ,l, as νarφ = 1. This implies that
no follower plays al, otherwise her cost would be at least 5,
and she would deviate to aw, paying 4. Thus, if l is positive,
there is p ∈ F with ap = au¯, while, if it is negative, there is
p ∈ F with ap = au. Therefore, τ satisfies all clauses.
Theorem 2. The problem of computing an OSE in symmetric
SCGs is not in Poly-APX unless P =NP, even when costs are
monotonic and players’ actions have cardinality two.
Proof. Given a 3SAT instance (C,U), we build an SCG
Γ(C,U) as in the proof of Theorem 1. As previously shown,
in an OSE σ of Γ(C,U), it holds cσ` =  if and only if (C,U)
is satisfiable. Next, we prove that, if (C,U) is not satisfiable,
then any OSE σ has cσ` ≥ 1. Suppose, by contradiction, there
exists an OSE σ = (σ`, a) with cσ` < 1. This implies that
σ`(aw) > 0 and νarw = 0, otherwise c
σ
` ≥ 1. Moreover, all
the followers must experience a cost at most of 4, otherwise
they would have an incentive to switch to aw. Thus, for ev-
ery u ∈ U , it must be the case that νaru,t ≤ 1, otherwise, if
νaru,t ≥ 2, some followers would have a cost at least 5. Simi-
larly, for every φ ∈ C, it must be the case that νarφ ≤ 1. Fol-
lowing the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1, we
can build a truth assignment satisfying all clauses, a contra-
diction. Finally, let  = 1
2I
, where I is the size of Γ(C,U).
Suppose there is a polynomial-time approximation algorithm
A with approximation factor poly(I), i.e., a polynomial func-
tion of I . If (C,U) is satisfiable, then A applied to Γ(C,U)
would return a solution with cost at most 1
2I
poly(I) < 1, for
I large enough. Thus, A would allow us to solve any 3SAT
instance in polynomial time, which is a contradiction unless
P = NP holds.
Theorem 3. The problem of computing an OSE in SCGs is
NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P = NP, even when
leader’s actions are singletons, costs are monotonic, and fol-
lowers are symmetric with actions of cardinality at most two.
Proof. The result is readily obtained from the proofs of The-
orems 1 and 2, by setting A` = {aw} in the reduction.
Lemma 4. O(i, B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) sat-
isfies the following recursive equation:
O(i, B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) =
min
pt∈{0,...,Bt} ∀t∈T
mt∈{0,...,Mt} ∀t∈T
vt∈{1,...,Vt} ∀t∈T
O(i− 1, p1, . . . , pT ,m1, . . . ,mT , v1, . . . , vT ) + bci(b)
s.t. b =
∑
t∈T
(Bt − pt) (1a)
Bt = pt ∀t ∈ T : i /∈ At (1b)
mt ≤Mt ∀t ∈ T (1c)
vt ≥ Vt ∀t ∈ T (1d)
ci(b) ≤Mt ∀t ∈ T : Bt − pt > 0 (1e)
ci(b+ 1) ≥ Vt ∀t ∈ T : i ∈ At (1f)
ci(b) ≤ vt ∀t ∈ T : Bt − pt > 0 (1g)
ci(b+ 1) ≥ mt ∀t ∈ T : i ∈ At. (1h)
Proof. We show that all the constraints are necessary. If Con-
strains (1b) were not satisfied, at least one player would play
an action not available to her. If Constraints (1c) were not
satisfied, there would exist a t ∈ T such that mt > Mt,
and, thus, there would be at least a resource in {1, . . . , i− 1}
having cost larger than Mt for players of class t. If Con-
straints (1d) were not satisfied, there would exist a t ∈ T
such that vt < Vt, and, thus, players of class t would incur a
cost strictly smaller than Vt when deviating to a resource in
{1, . . . , i − 1}. If Constraints (1e) were not satisfied, there
would exist a t ∈ T : Bt−pt > 0 such that ci(b) > Mt, and,
thus, Mt would be smaller than the cost of the most expen-
sive resource used by players of class t. If Constraints (1f)
were not satisfied, there would exist a t ∈ T : i ∈ At such
that ci(b + 1) < Vt, and, thus, players of class t would in-
cur a cost strictly smaller than Vt upon deviating to another
resource. If Constraints (1g) were not satisfied, there would
exist a t ∈ T : Bt − pt > 0 such that ci(b) > vt and, thus,
at least one player of class t using resource i would have an
incentive to deviate to another resource. If Constraints (1h)
were not satisfied, there would exist a t ∈ T : i ∈ At such
that ci(b + 1) < mt and at least one player of class t experi-
encing a cost of mt would prefer to switch to resource i.
Theorem 5. In T -class singleton CGs without leadership,
an optimal (given an optimality criterion) NE can be found in
O(n6T r4T+1). In T -class SSCGs, an OSE can be found in
O(n6T r4T+2) if we restrict the leader to play pure strategies.
Proof. Since there are at most nr different values of costs
ci(x) (i ∈ R, x ∈ {1, . . . , n}), for each t ∈ T there
are at most nr values of Mt and Vt. There are also ex-
actly r values of i ∈ R and exactly nt values of Bt
for each t ∈ T . Hence, the dynamic programming ta-
ble of O(i, B1, . . . , BT ,M1, . . . ,MT , V1, . . . , VT ) contains
O(n3T r2T+1) entries. Computing an entry of the table re-
quires O(n3T r2T ). Overall, an optimal NE is computed in
O(n6T r4T+1). For T -class SSCGs with the leader restricted
to play pure strategies, it suffices to run the algorithm for each
i ∈ A`, using as optimality criterion the minimization of the
cost of i. Since there are O(r) leader’s actions, the overall
complexity is O(n6T r4T+2).
The proof of Theorem 6 is based on a reduction from K-
PARTITION, which reads as follows.
Definition 2 (K-PARTITION). Given a finite set S =
{s1, . . . , s|S|} of positive integers si ∈ N+ with
∑
si∈S si =
2X and a positive integer K ≤ |S|2 , is there a subset S′ ⊆ S
such that |S′| = K and∑si∈S′ si = X?
Theorem 6. Computing an OSE in T -class SSCGs is NP-
hard, even when cost functions are monotonic and |T | = 4.
Proof. Our reduction from K-PARTITION shows that a
polynomial-time algorithm for finding an OSE in T -class
SSCGs would allow us to solve any K-PARTITION in-
stance in polynomial time. Given aK-PARTITION instance
(S,K), we build a game Γ(S,K) that admits an OSE σ with
cσ` ≤ 2X− XK if and only if (S,K) has answer yes, i.e., there
is S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = K and ∑si∈S′ si = X . Let, w.l.o.g.,
si ≤ X for all si ∈ S (if not, (S,K) has answer no).
Mapping. Γ(S,K) is defined as follows:
• N = F ∪{`} and T = {1, 2, 3, 4}, where F = ⋃t∈T Ft
with |F1| = K, |F2| = 2|S|, |F3| = 1, and |F4| = 1;
• R = RS ∪ {rw, rx, ry, rz} with RS = {ri | si ∈ S};
• A1 = RS ∪ {rw}, A2 = RS ∪ {rz}, A3 = {rw, ry},
A4 = {rx, ry}, and A` = RS ∪ {ry}.
Costs are specified in the table below, with Cry,f =
6K−2
2K2−K ,
Cri,f =
(
1− 2XKsi + 2XK
)
2XK
si
, andCri,` =
2X(2X−si)
si
.
x cri,f crw,f crx,f cry,f crz,f cri,` cry,`
1 0 1K
3
K
2
K 2XK Cri,` 0
2 2XKsi 1
3
K Cry,f 2XK Cri,` X
4
[3, n] Cri,f 1
3
K Cry,f 2XK X
4 X4
Clearly, Γ(S,K) can be constructed in polynomial time,
since n = K + 2|S|+ 3, r = |S|+ 4, |A1| = |A2| = |A`| =
|S|+1, |A3| = |A4| = 2, and each cost can be encoded with a
number of bits polynomial in the size of the instance (S,K).
Notice that resource costs are monotonic in the congestion.
If. Suppose that (S,K) has answer yes, and let S′ ⊆ S be
such that |S′| = K and ∑si∈S′ si = X . Using S′, we can
recover σ = (σ`, {νt}t∈T ) such that the followers’ configu-
rations {νt}t∈T represent an NE for σ` and cσ` = 2X − XK .
Thus, in any OSE the leader’s cost must be less than or
equal to 2X − XK . In particular, for every si ∈ S′, let
ν1,ri = 1, ν2,ri = 0, and σ`(ri) =
si
2XK . Instead, for
si /∈ S′, let ν1,ri = 0, ν2,ri = 2, and σ`(ri) = 0. More-
over, we let ν1,rw = 0, ν2,rz = 2K, ν3,rw = 1, ν3,ry = 0,
ν4,rx = 1, ν4,ry = 0, and σ`(ry) =
2K−1
2K . It is easy to
see that both {νt}t∈T and σ` are well-defined. Next, we
prove that {νt}t∈T represent an NE for σ`. First, follow-
ers of class 1 experience a cost of 2XKsi
si
2XK = 1, and, thus,
they do not have incentive to deviate to resource rw, as they
would still pay 1. Similarly, they do not switch to another
resource ri ∈ RS , since, if si ∈ S′, they would get a cost
of 2XKsi (1 − si2XK ) + Cri,f si2XK = 2XK > 1, while, if
si /∈ S′, they would pay Cri,f > 1. Moreover, followers of
class 2 do not deviate, since, if they are selecting a resource
ri ∈ RS , then their current cost is 2XKsi and they would pay
at least 2XK ≥ 2XKsi by deviating, while, if they are using
rz , then they experience a cost of 2XK and they would pay
at least 2XK by switching to a resource ri ∈ RS . Finally,
the follower of class 3 pays 1K and she does not deviate to ry ,
as she would incur a cost at least of 2K , and, analogously, the
follower of class 4 does not deviate since her cost would be
Cry,f
2K−1
2K +
2
K
1
2K =
3
K and she is paying
3
K . In conclu-
sion, cσ` =
∑
si∈S′ Cri,`
si
2XK =
∑
si∈S′
2X
K −
∑
si∈S′
si
K =
2X − XK , as |S′| = K and
∑
si∈S′ si = X .
Only if. Suppose there exists an OSE σ = (σ`, {νt}t∈T )
such that cσ` ≤ 2X − XK . Using σ, we build S′ ⊆ S such
that |S′| = K and ∑si∈S′ si = X , showing that (S,K)
has answer yes. First, it must be the case that σ`(ry) > 0
and νry = 0, otherwise the leader’s cost cannot be smaller
than the minimum among costs Cri,`, which, since si ≤ X
for all si ∈ S, is at least 2X(2X−X)X = 2X > 2X − XK .
Thus, it must be ν3,ry = ν4,ry = 0 and ν3,rw = ν4,rx = 1.
As a result, σ`(ry) ≥ 1 − 12K , otherwise the follower of
class 4 would have an incentive to deviate to resource ry ,
paying Cry,fσ`(ry) +
2
K (1 − σ`(ry)) < 3K . This implies
that
∑
ri∈RS σ`(ri) ≤ 12K . Moreover, ν1,rw = 0, other-
wise, if ν1,rw > 0, the follower of class 3 would experi-
ence a cost of 1 and she would switch to ry , paying at most
Cry,f < 1, assuming, w.l.o.g., K ≥ 4. Thus, there must
be K different resources ri ∈ RS such that ν1,ri = 1 and
ν2,ri = 0, since, if either ν1,ri > 1 or ν2,ri > 0, then
νri > 1 and the followers of class 1 selecting ri would ex-
perience a cost greater than or equal to 2XKsi > 1, thus
having an incentive to deviate to rw, paying 1. Let R′S ={ri ∈ RS | ν1,ri = 1} (notice that |R′S | = K). It must
be the case that ν2,ri < 3 for all ri /∈ R′S , otherwise a fol-
lower of class 2 would have an incentive to deviate to rz (as
Cri,f > 2XK). Thus, since |F2| = 2|S|, there are at least
2K followers on rz . Furthermore, ν2,ri > 0 for all ri /∈ R′S ,
otherwise the followers of class 2 selecting rz would have an
incentive to switch to ri, paying less than 2XKsi ≤ 2XK.
Now, let us fix any ri ∈ R′S . Say σ`(ri) < si2XK , then
the followers of class 2 using rz would deviate to ri, pay-
ing 2XKsi (1− σ`(ri)) +Cri,fσ`(ri) < 2XK. Moreover, say
σ`(ri) >
si
2XK , then the follower of class 1 on ri would devi-
ate to rw, paying 1 < 2XKsi σ`(ri). As a result, σ`(ri) =
si
2XK
for every ri ∈ R′S . Since
∑
ri∈RS σ`(ri) ≤ 12K , we also
have
∑
ri∈R′S σ`(ri) =
1
2XK
∑
ri∈R′S si ≤
1
2K , implying∑
ri∈R′S si ≤ X . It must also be the case that σ`(ri) = 0
for all ri /∈ R′S . If not, then there would be rj ∈ R′S with
ν2,rj ∈ {1, 2} and σ`(rj) > 0, which implies that cσ` =
X4σ`(rj) +
∑
ri 6=rj∈RS Cri,`σ`(ri) >
∑
ri∈R′S
2X−si
K =
2X − 1K
∑
ri∈R′S si ≥ 2X −
X
K , a contradiction. Finally,
c` =
∑
ri∈R′S Cri,`σ`(ri) = 2X−
1
K
∑
ri∈R′S si ≤ 2X−
X
K ,
which implies
∑
ri∈R′S si ≥ X . Thus,
∑
ri∈R′S si = X . Let-
ting S′ = {si ∈ S | ri ∈ R′S}, we have |S′| = K and∑
si∈S′ si = X .
B Additional Experimental Results
Figure 2 reports all the running times of our formulations on
the game instances composing our testbed.
Moreover, Tables 1 and 2 show average optimality gaps for
the game instances where a feasible solution is found within
the time limit. The optimality gap is computed as UB−LBUB ,
whereUB is the value of the best solution found by the solver
within the time limit and LB is the lower-bound returned by
the solver. We only provide the results for the largest game
instances. Specifically, Table 1 reports the results for Formu-
lation (2) on random T -class SSCGs with nt = r, while Ta-
ble 2 shows the results for Formulation (3) on random SCGs
with n = 3 r.
T \ r 10 30 50 70 90
1 0 (100) 0.00 (100) 0.00 (100) 0.08 (100) 0.35 (100)
2 0 (100) 0.00 (100) 0.41 (100) 0.51 (100) 0.81 (70)
3 0 (100) 0.17 (100) 0.79 (100) 0.93 (100) 0.95 (70)
4 0 (100) 0.43 (100) 0.90 (90) 0.97 (45) 0.99 (10)
Table 1: Avg. optimality gaps (% of games where feasible solution
found) of Form. (2) on random T -class SSCGs (nt = r).
|ap| \ r 5 10 15 20 25
1 0 (100) 0.00 (100) 0.15 (100) 0.63 (100) 0.63 (100)
2 0 (100) 0.25 (100) 0.90 (100) 0.95 (95) 0.98 (40)
3 0 (100) 0.76 (100) 0.98 (80) 0.99 (10) 0.99 (10)
4 0 (100) 0.82 (100) 0.99 (35) – (0) – (0)
5 0 (100) 0.88 (100) 0.99 (5) – (0) – (0)
Table 2: Avg. optimality gaps (% of games where feasible solution
found) of Formulation (3) on random SCGs (n = 3r).
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Figure 2: Computing times of Formulations (2) and (3) on randomly generated game instances and worst-case instances built on the base of
our hardness reductions, as described in Section 7.
